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I.

INTRODUCTION

Plaintiffs alleging legal malpractice in some states must file
1
2
supporting their claims before trial.
expert affidavits
Requirements for these affidavits vary by state; in Minnesota, for
example, they must contain specific details linking the defendant’s
3
negligent conduct to the plaintiff’s damages. This imposes a high
burden on plaintiffs and filters out frivolous lawsuits that will never
4
obtain legitimate expert support. This burden, however, is a
double-edged sword: it can also preclude meritorious claims that,
5
for some reason, cannot timely secure adequate expert support.
Minnesota Statutes section 544.42 requires plaintiffs to file two
pretrial expert affidavits supporting legal and other non-medical
6
malpractice claims. Section 544.42 also allows for additional time
to remedy defects in the second, more detailed and burdensome of
7
the two affidavit requirements, which helps prevent dismissals of
meritorious claims. In Guzick v. Kimball, the Minnesota Supreme
1. Expert affidavits may sometimes be called “certificates of merit.” See
Certificate, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
2. See 4 RONALD E. MALLEN & ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 37:62 (2016 ed.) (citing ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602 (West, Westlaw through
2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 52d Leg.); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-20-602 (West,
Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the 70th Gen. Assemb.); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-9.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess. of the Gen. Assemb.); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 668.11 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Reg. Sess.); MINN. STAT. § 544.42
(2016); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:53A-27 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Leg.); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 19.1 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2016 2d Reg. Sess. of the
55th Leg.); PA.R.C.P. No. 1042.3 (West, Westlaw through Sept. 1, 2016)).
3. See, e.g., MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 4(a) (requiring details on “issues of
negligence, malpractice, or causation” and “a summary of the grounds for each
opinion”).
4. See, e.g., Parker v. O’Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987),
aff’d, 428 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1988) (noting the purpose of a medical affidavit
requirement is to eliminate “nuisance malpractice suits”).
5. See Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.
1990) (noting that an abrupt dismissal for failure to file an affidavit could
terminate a “meritorious cause of action”).
6. MINN. STAT. § 544.42.
7. Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c).
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Court established that a legal malpractice plaintiff can obtain
8
additional time only if her affidavit passes a two-step process. First,
provided a set of facts, courts determine on a case-by-case basis
9
which elements of legal malpractice require expert support. If a lay
juror would likely not understand how the facts of the case relate to
an element of malpractice, expert support is required for that
10
element. Second, courts evaluate the expert support for each
required element, and if the support is deficient, the court may
dismiss the case before trial without granting the plaintiff any time
11
to remedy the deficiency.
Guzick was the supreme court’s first legal malpractice case
interpreting section 544.42. Arguably, its primary contribution to
Minnesota jurisprudence was interpreting the first of the two steps:
determining which elements of legal malpractice require expert
support. Guzick upheld the second step—the court’s ability to
evaluate expert support—from the court’s previous case on section
12
544.42.
Guzick’s two-step process is problematic because it opens the
door to two ways plaintiffs can lose their cases. First, a plaintiff
might fail to anticipate that the court may require expert support
for an element of malpractice after applying its lay juror standard.
This would make the affidavit insufficient. Second, even if the
plaintiff correctly identifies all the elements that require expert
support, she still may not solicit enough detail from the expert.
Again, this would be insufficient. Guzick, therefore, sets two traps
for plaintiffs to lose a case with prejudice on a procedural misstep.
This threatens the law’s “primary objective . . . to dispose of cases
13
on the merits.” This is what is at stake after Guzick.

8. See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 49 (Minn. 2015) (noting that “[i]f
expert disclosure is required for a particular element [of malpractice],” the court
must then determine if the disclosure for that element is satisfactory). The Guzick
court held that the plaintiff’s affidavit did not pass this process. Id. at 51.
9. See id. at 48–49.
10. Id. at 49 (citing Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d
107, 116 (1977)).
11. See id. at 51–52; see also Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732
N.W.2d 209, 217–19 (Minn. 2007).
12. The previous Minnesota Supreme Court case on section 544.42 was an
accounting malpractice case. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d 209.
13. Firoved v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278, 283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368
(1967).
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This Note begins with a history of legal malpractice and the
14
statutory framework underlying Guzick. The facts, procedural
15
history, and majority analysis of Guzick follow. The analysis of this
Note argues that courts should not dismiss cases on the basis of a
16
defective affidavit without providing time to remedy defects. The
court’s unforgiving approach contradicts legislative intent to avoid
dismissing meritorious lawsuits and needlessly goes beyond the
17
plain language of section 544.42. The court’s self-imposed ability
18
to grant extra time on an evaluative basis also opens the door for
inconsistent and unpredictable application. This, in turn, may
result in public distrust in the legal profession. On a plain reading
of the statute, extra time is automatically granted to remedy a
19
defect. Consequently, when the court has the opportunity, it
20
should overrule Guzick and adopt a plain reading of the statute.
II. HISTORY
This section explains the history of a narrow area of
malpractice law: Minnesota’s requirement for expert affidavits
certifying medical and non-medical malpractice claims. To
understand these certification requirements, this section begins
with a brief historical overview of legal malpractice in Minnesota.
This discussion then shifts to a period of radical change in
Minnesota medical malpractice law: the years before and after the
1986 Tort Reform Act became effective. As one of its many new
provisions, the Tort Reform Act created a statutory requirement for
21
expert affidavits in medical malpractice lawsuits. In 1997, this
requirement was extended to non-medical professional
14. See infra Part II.
15. See infra Part III.
16. See infra Part IV; see also Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 55 (Lillehaug, J.,
concurring) (arguing that not providing additional time for plaintiffs to remedy
affidavit defects might “damage [] our bedrock principle of statutory
interpretation” and cause “the premature death of potentially meritorious
claims”).
17. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 52–56.
18. See id. at 53 (noting that the “concepts of ‘major’ and ‘minor’
deficiencies [] are judicial concoctions”).
19. See id. at 55 (citing Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2011)).
20. See id.
21. Tort Reform Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws 840,
871–72 (creating section 145.682, a new statute for expert certification in medical
malpractice).
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malpractice, including legal malpractice, in a separate but very
22
similar statute. Finally, this section provides an in-depth look at
how Minnesota courts have applied and interpreted these statutory
requirements for expert affidavits.
A.

A General History of Legal Malpractice

The Minnesota Supreme Court has long held that if an
attorney’s negligence harms a client, the attorney is responsible for
23
the damages. The court recognized early on that it is not always
24
clear when an attorney-client relationship exists. But when there is
an attorney-client relationship, the court has articulated that the
scope of a lawyer’s duty to her client is to act “in good faith to the
25
best of [her] skill and knowledge . . . .” An attorney abiding by this
standard does not breach her duty because of a simple error or
26
mistake.
Putting much of this common law into a modern framework,
the court adopted four elements that are now required for a prima
facie legal malpractice claim: (1) an attorney-client relationship,
(2) a negligent act, (3) proximate causation, and (4) but-for
27
causation. Soon after the court established these elements, it also
established a general rule that a negligent act—the duty and
28
breach components—must be supported by expert testimony.
The court took this standard directly from its medical malpractice
29
jurisprudence. If these elements were not supported by proper

22. Act of May 30, 1997, ch. 212, § 2, 1997 Minn. Laws 1917, 1917–20
(creating section 544.42, a new statute for expert certification in non-medical
malpractice).
23. See, e.g., Schoregge v. Bishop, 29 Minn. 367, 371, 13 N.W. 194, 196 (1882)
(“The attorney is answerable to his clients in damages for any abuse of his trust, or
the consequences of his ignorance, negligence, or indiscretion . . . .”).
24. See Ryan v. Long, 35 Minn. 394, 394, 29 N.W. 51, 51 (1886) (holding that
an attorney-client relationship existed when an attorney provided solicited legal
advice); see also Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 692
(Minn. 1980) (recognizing Ryan as the first Minnesota case to question whether an
attorney-client relationship existed).
25. Sjobeck v. Leach, 213 Minn. 360, 365, 6 N.W.2d 819, 822 (1942) (quoting
5 AM. JUR. Attorneys at Law § 125 (1936)).
26. Id.
27. Togstad, 291 N.W.2d at 692 (citing Christy v. Saliterman, 288 Minn. 144,
150, 179 N.W.2d 288, 293–94 (1970)).
28. Hill v. Okay Const. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (1977).
29. Id.
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expert testimony at trial, the consequence was typically a directed
30
verdict in favor of the defendant. Notably, the court made an
exception for the requirement of expert testimony when the
lawyer’s duty and breach of that duty “are within the area of
31
common knowledge and lay comprehension.”
Today, the standards for expert testimony are much stricter.
Section 544.42 requires that a properly-identified expert supports a
32
legal malpractice claim well before trial even begins. As the
discussion below explores, medical malpractice law influenced the
33
development of these stricter procedural limitations.
B.

Minnesota’s Tort Reform Act

In the 1970s and 1980s, medical malpractice lawsuits across the
34
nation were becoming more frequent and jury awards were
35
In turn, insurers raised their rates, and
getting larger.
36
consequently, some medical services became more expensive.
This became a nationwide problem, and many states initiated tort
reform to reduce the number of lawsuits and the size of damage
37
awards.
30. See Lhotka v. Larson, 307 Minn. 121, 130, 238 N.W.2d 870, 876 (1976);
Silver v. Redleaf, 292 Minn. 463, 463, 194 N.W.2d 271, 271 (1972); Swanson v.
Chatterton, 281 Minn. 129, 130–31, 160 N.W.2d 662, 664 (1968).
31. Hill, 312 Minn. at 336–37, 252 N.W.2d at 116.
32. See MINN. STAT. § 544.42 (2016).
33. See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D. Minn. 2000) (stating
that the Minnesota legislature used a medical malpractice statute “as a blueprint”
for a statute relating to legal malpractice).
34. For example, a national insurer, The St. Paul Companies, Inc. (now
merged with Travelers insurance), reported 3113 physician malpractice claims in
1979; in 1983, the company reported 5870 claims—an eighty-eight percent
increase. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., OFF. OF THE LEGIS. AUDITOR, ST. OF MINN.,
NO.
86-0333,
INSURANCE
REGULATION
81
(1986),
PUB.
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/other/860333.pdf.
35. In 1980, the average jury award was $404,726; just four years later in
1984, it had more than doubled to $954,858. Patricia M. Danzon, The Frequency and
Severity of Medical Malpractice Claims: New Evidence, 49 L. CONTEMP. PROB. 57, 57–58
(1986) (citing JURY VERDICT RESEARCH, INC., INJURY VALUATION REPORTS, No. 292,
CURRENT AWARD TRENDS 18–19 (1985)).
36. Shirley Qual, A Survey of Medical Malpractice Tort Reform, 12 WM. MITCHELL
L. REV. 417, 418–19 (1986).
37. PROGRAM EVALUATION DIV., supra note 34, at 94 (“Many states have tried to
[reduce the frequency and size of damage awards] by enacting changes in the tort
liability system.”).
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In January 1986, a division of the Legislative Audit
Commission released a report about insurance regulation in
Minnesota, which noted a “rapid increase in rates” for some
38
commercial liability insurance, including medical malpractice. It
further noted that national trends in jury awards “made certain
39
lines of insurance appear very risky to insurance companies.” The
report also pointed towards evidence that tort reforms in other
40
states helped contain insurance claims.
In March 1986, the Minnesota legislature approved the Tort
41
Reform Act. A Senate session report stated that the Tort Reform
Act “provide[d] a long-term approach to reducing insurance costs
by providing tort reform directed at decreasing the cost of civil
lawsuits, which [was] increasing at the rate of 10 to 15 percent per
42
year.” The report also stated one of the act’s goals was
43
“eliminating frivolous civil lawsuits.”
Part of the Tort Reform Act required affidavits from experts to
44
support a claim for malpractice. This requirement made it more
45
difficult for plaintiffs to proceed with lawsuits. This, in turn,
46
helped prevent frivolous lawsuits. The next section considers
these affidavit requirements in detail.
C.

Affidavits for Medical Malpractice: Section 145.682

Section 145.682 was drafted as part of the Tort Reform Act, in
47
part to reduce frivolous medical malpractice lawsuits. The statute

38. Id. at xii.
39. Id.
40. Id. at xiii.
41. Tort Reform Act of Mar. 25, 1986, ch. 455, § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws 840,
886.
42. Karen L. Clark et al., Bill Highlights, 12 SESSION REV., no. 2, 1986, at 1, 11,
https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/pre2003/other/861076.pdf (discussing the
“Omnibus insurance bill”).
43. Id.
44. § 60, 1986 Minn. Laws at 871–72.
45. In its report, the Program Evaluation Division mentioned that “several
states have changed evidentiary and procedural aspects of trials” in order to
“impose greater burdens on the plaintiffs of a personal injury case.” PROGRAM
EVALUATION DIV., supra note 34, at 97.
46. See Parker v. O’Phelan, 414 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987)
(stating that the primary purpose of section 145.682 was to “eliminate nuisance
malpractice suits”), aff’d, 428 N.W.2d 361 (Minn. 1988).
47. Id.; see generally E. Curtis Roeder, Note, Introduction to Minnesota’s Tort
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currently requires two affidavits of expert opinion in support of the
48
malpractice claim. The first affidavit, the affidavit of expert review,
49
is usually filed with the plaintiff’s complaint. The affidavit of
expert review must only disclose that an expert read the facts,
concluded that the defendant breached a duty she owed to the
plaintiff, and concluded that the defendant’s breach caused
50
damages. The expert is qualified if it is reasonable to expect that
51
her testimony would be admitted at trial. Second, an affidavit of
expert disclosure must be served within 180 days of the
52
commencement of discovery. The second affidavit, the affidavit of
expert disclosure, must identify the expert and provide the
53
substance and grounds of the opinion. In place of a formal
affidavit of expert disclosure, answering an interrogatory can also
54
satisfy the statute. If a plaintiff does not meet these requirements,
55
the defendant can submit a motion to dismiss the case.
In 2001, in response to meritorious lawsuits being dismissed
56
over minor technical errors, a bill was introduced to create a safe
harbor period for remedying defective affidavits of expert
57
disclosure. The House sponsor of the bill specifically said that he
wanted to protect plaintiffs from a civil procedure that was “too
58
strict.” He added that “there [was] a developing practice among

Reform Act, 13 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 277, 303–06 (1987).
48. MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2 (2016).
49. Id.
50. Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 3(a).
51. Id. As an example, a general pediatrician with no specialization in
pediatric oncology was not qualified to provide an affidavit regarding a bone
marrow transplant. Teffeteller v. Univ. of Minn., 645 N.W.2d 420, 427–28 (Minn.
2002).
52. MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2.
53. Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 4(a).
54. Id.
55. Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(a).
56. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Minn.
2007) (citing Minn. S., S. Deb. on S.F. 0936, 82d Minn. Leg., Reg. Sess. (May 16,
2001) (audio tape) (statement of Sen. Neuville)). Before the enactment of the
safe harbor provision, it was well established that section 145.682 could have harsh
outcomes. See generally Jason Leo, Comment, Torts—Medical Malpractice: The
Legislature’s Attempt to Prevent Cases without Merit Denies Valid Claims, 27 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 1399, 1419–22 (2000).
57. H.F. 1051, 82d Leg., 2d Sess. (Minn. 2001).
58. MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES: PUB. INFO. OFF., NEW LAWS 2001: A
COMPLETE SUMMARY OF THE REGULAR LEGISLATIVE SESSION AND SPECIAL SESSION 88
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medical malpractice defense attorneys to move to dismiss otherwise
59
legitimate complaints” because of minor technical errors.
Although Governor Jesse Ventura vetoed the bill because of an
60
issue unrelated to safe harbor in 2001, he signed another bill
61
containing the safe harbor provision in 2002 that became effective
62
on May 22, 2002. Section 145.682 now contains a safe harbor
provision that provides plaintiffs at least forty-five days to correct
63
errors upon service of a motion to dismiss.
D.

Affidavits for Legal and Other Non-Medical Malpractice: Section
544.42

In 1997, the legislature enacted section 544.42 to expand the
scope of the principles in section 145.682 to include non-medical
64
professionals. Not surprisingly, the language, content, and timing
65
requirements of section 544.42 closely track section 145.682. The
66
two-affidavit requirement is virtually identical. First, the affidavit
of expert review, which is typically served with the complaint, only
needs to verify that a qualified expert reviewed the facts of the case

(2001), https://www.leg.state.mn.us/docs/2008/other/080895.pdf.
59. Id.
60. See id.
61. See Act of May 22, 2002, ch. 403, § 1, 2002 Minn. Laws 1706, 1706–07
(codified at MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 6 (2002)).
62. Id. at 1712.
63. See MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(c)(2) (2016) (“[T]he time for
hearing the motion is at least 45 days from the date of service of the motion.”).
64. See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D. Minn. 2000); see also
MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 1(1) (defining “professionals” as attorneys,
architects, accountants, engineers, land surveyors, and landscape architects). The
hearing on the bill that created section 544.42 demonstrated that section 544.42’s
purpose was to avoid frivolous lawsuits, just as it was for section 145.682: during
the hearing, Senator Ranum, an author of the bill, stated that “if we begin to do
what we’ve done in the medical malpractice area . . . people will look for . . .
experts early and evaluate their cases earlier, and I believe that if there are
frivolous lawsuits that . . . really aren’t meritorious, you will screen them out in this
process.” Hearing on S.F. 627 Before the S. Judiciary Comm., 80th Minn. Leg., Reg.
Sess. (Mar. 25, 1997) (on file with Mitchell Hamline Law Review).
65. See Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F. Supp. 2d 1081, 1090 (D. Minn. 2001) (“[T]he
statutory language for both statutes is, in major substance, the same.”); House, 105
F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (discussing that the two statutes have “nearly identical”
content).
66. Compare MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2, with id. § 544.42, subdiv. 2.
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67

and found probable negligence. Then, the affidavit of expert
disclosure, which outlines the expert’s reasoning, must be served
68
within 180 days of the commencement of discovery. An answer to
69
an interrogatory can serve as an affidavit of expert disclosure. If a
plaintiff fails to meet these requirements, the defendant can move
70
to dismiss the case.
The state legislature enacted section 544.42 with a safe harbor
provision similar to section 145.682’s, which can provide the
plaintiff sixty days to remedy any deficiencies in the second affidavit
71
upon service of a motion to dismiss. However, unlike section
145.682, the defendant’s motion to dismiss does not trigger safe
harbor under section 544.42; the court triggers safe harbor by
72
providing the plaintiff with notice of the affidavit’s deficiencies.
The purpose of the new statute was partly to avoid problems
associated with the application of section 145.682, which did not
73
have a safe harbor provision at the time.
E.

Minnesota Case Law Interpreting the Statutes

Minnesota courts have decided cases interpreting these
74
statutes with two goals in mind: avoiding frivolous lawsuits and
75
protecting meritorious lawsuits. Long before these statutes were
67. Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 3(a)(1).
68. Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 4(a).
69. Id.
70. Id. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(a).
71. See id. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c).
72. Compare id. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(c)(2) (“[T]he time for hearing the
motion is at least 45 days from the date of service of the motion.”), with id.
§ 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (“[A]fter notice by the court, the nonmoving party is given
60 days to satisfy the disclosure requirements.”).
73. See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (D. Minn. 2000). During
the Senate Committee Hearing on the bill for section 544.42, one speaker noted
that section 145.682 should also be amended to allow some leeway for plaintiffs
because motions were routinely challenging cases on the basis of inadequate
expert qualifications. See Hearing on S.F. 627, supra note 64 (statement of Mr.
Carlson). Section 544.42’s safe harbor provision took care of this problem, but at
the time, section 145.682 did not provide this option. See Broehm v. Mayo Clinic
Rochester, 690 N.W.2d 721, 725 n.1 (Minn. 2005) (noting that the legislature
added the safe-harbor provision to section 145.682 in 2002).
74. See, e.g., Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc., 599 N.W.2d 572, 578 (Minn.
1999) (“It is the legislative choice to implement the policy of eliminating frivolous
medical malpractice lawsuits by dismissal.”).
75. See, e.g., Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193
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enacted, the court was concerned about dismissing meritorious
76
cases on procedural grounds. The two goals regarding frivolous
and meritorious cases also reflect the goals of the legislature: the
initial purpose of the medical malpractice statute was to make it
77
harder to file frivolous lawsuits, but the legislature showed that it
was also concerned about dismissing meritorious cases when it
78
provided safe harbor provisions for sections 145.682 and 544.42.
The court has struggled to strike a balance between the two goals
because they present a dichotomy: allowing too many malpractice
suits to go to trial will allow many frivolous lawsuits to proceed, and
trying to stamp out every potentially frivolous case will preclude
79
meritorious cases.
Two recent Minnesota Supreme Court cases demonstrate that
this struggle has continued. In 2007, the court considered Brown80
Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., its first non-medical
malpractice case involving a deficient affidavit under section
81
544.42. Brown-Wilbert required that plaintiffs’ affidavits strictly
(Minn. 1990) (“[T]he sanction imposed by section 145.682 is the abrupt
termination with prejudice of what may be a meritorious cause of action.”).
76. Firoved v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278, 283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368
(1967) (“An order of dismissal on procedural grounds runs counter to the primary
objective of the law to dispose of cases on the merits. Since a dismissal with
prejudice operates as an adjudication on the merits, it is the most punitive
sanction which can be imposed for noncompliance with the rules or order of the
court or for failure to prosecute.”).
77. Clark et al., supra note 42 (“The tort reform provided by Chapter 455 is
aimed at eliminating frivolous civil lawsuits . . . .”).
78. See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 58.
79. A case from before the medical malpractice statute was enacted sums up
the dichotomy nicely: “Physicians should not be plagued with defending
unmeritorious lawsuits, but a wronged patient is entitled to pursue a warranted
claim.” Anderson v. Florence, 288 Minn. 351, 359, 181 N.W.2d 873, 878 (1970).
80. 732 N.W.2d 209 (Minn. 2007).
81. Although the Supreme Court of Minnesota did not address what to do
with a deficient affidavit before Brown-Wilbert, lower Minnesota courts and federal
courts denied safe harbor in at least three cases because the plaintiff completely
failed to file the second affidavit under section 544.42. See Meyer v. Dygert, 156 F.
Supp. 2d 1081, 1091 (D. Minn. 2001) (citing House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d
1045, 1054 (D. Minn. 2000) (noting that safe harbor only applies “where the
plaintiff has filed a deficient affidavit”)); House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1051 (stating
that the sixty days of safe harbor serve to “avoid[] harsh consequences arising from
inadvertent drafting errors . . . and is available only when . . . filed within 180
days”); Middle River-Snake River Watershed Dist. v. Dennis Drewes, Inc., 692
N.W.2d 87, 91 (Minn. Ct. App. 2005) (noting that the court has to issue specific
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meet detailed substantive requirements to use safe harbor and did
82
not provide an exception for affidavits filed in good faith. In 2011,
83
Wesely v. Flor considered the court’s first medical malpractice case
that analyzed section 145.682 after the legislature added the safe
84
harbor provision to the statute in 2002. Wesely determined that
virtually all plaintiffs that timely submit an affidavit should be
granted safe harbor—likely even those that do not file in good
85
faith. Despite sections 145.682 and 544.42 both containing safe
harbor provisions, the two holdings end up on opposite ends of the
meritorious/frivolous dichotomy. To understand this discrepancy,
this subsection shows how the medical malpractice case law has
shifted from a concern for protecting meritorious cases to
preventing frivolous cases. The non-medical malpractice case law
then followed suit. Finally, after the addition of the safe harbor
provision to section 145.682, the medical malpractice case law
moved back towards a greater concern for meritorious cases, but
the non-medical malpractice case law did not.
1.

A Second Chance for Meritorious Cases: Sorenson v. St. Paul
Ramsey Medical Center

The Minnesota Supreme Court was initially very concerned
about dismissing meritorious lawsuits in the years before and after
86
section 145.682 was enacted. The court avoided a rigid

deficiencies in the affidavit if it grants safe harbor, and there can be no
deficiencies in a non-existent affidavit).
82. Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216 (“[W]e read section 544.42, subdivision
4, to describe objective requirements for an affidavit of expert disclosure that can
be measured on the face of any document that is claimed to be such an affidavit,
without inquiry into counsel’s intent.”).
83. 806 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011).
84. Id. at 40 (“This is our first opportunity to interpret the safe-harbor
provision of section 145.682.”).
85. See id. at 41–42 (“Here, under section 145.682, the safe-harbor period is
an automatic, 45-day delay before the court hears any arguments or makes any
decisions regarding deficiencies in the affidavit.”).
86. See, e.g., Dennie v. Metro. Med. Ctr., 387 N.W.2d 401, 404 (Minn. 1986).
Dennie was a medical malpractice case decided just before the enactment of
section 145.682. Quoting an older case, Dennie noted that “[a]n order of dismissal
on procedural grounds runs counter to the primary objective of the law to dispose
of cases on the merits.” Id. (quoting Firoved v. Gen. Motors Corp., 277 Minn. 278,
283, 152 N.W.2d 364, 368 (1967)).
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87

application of the statute that might dismiss meritorious cases.
This meant that when a plaintiff filed a potentially deficient
affidavit, or even no affidavit at all, the court would err on the side
88
of avoiding dismissal. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Medical Center was
89
a major case in this trend.
In Sorenson, a woman sued a hospital and two doctors for
90
medical malpractice over the stillbirth of her child. Her counsel
properly filed the first affidavit and timely filed the second
91
affidavit. The defendants were not satisfied with the second
affidavit, so they moved to compel the plaintiff to answer
interrogatories and filed interrogatories requesting the substance
92
of the expert’s testimony. The plaintiff timely answered the
interrogatories, and the defendants then withdrew their motion to
93
compel answers. Defendants then “wait[ed] out the 180 days” and
moved for summary judgment on the basis that the plaintiff did not
94
meet the affidavit requirements.
The Sorenson court acknowledged that the plaintiff’s
interrogatory answers were defective and could not serve as a
95
second affidavit. The court reasoned that the answers simply
87. For example, see Sorenson’s discussion of “borderline cases.” Sorenson v.
St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn. 1990).
88. Where no affidavit is filed at all, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
allowed additional time on the basis of excusable neglect. For example, in Stern, a
plaintiff sued her dentist for medical malpractice and failed to file a second
affidavit before the 180-day deadline. Stern v. Dill, 442 N.W.2d 322, 323 (Minn.
1989). The plaintiff requested her dental records from the defendant, but he did
not release the records for about three months. Id. This reduced the amount of
time the plaintiff’s expert had to determine a causal relationship for the alleged
negligence; partly on this basis, the court granted the plaintiff an extension for
excusable neglect. Id. at 325. Although section 145.682 did not allow for this
extension, Minnesota Rule of Civil Procedure 6.02 provides the court discretionary
power to hear motions after a statute’s timing requirement expires if there is
excusable neglect. Id. at 324 (citing MINN. R. CIV. P. 6.02). And the rules supersede
a statute when a statute conflicts with a procedural rule relating to “pleading,
practice, [or] procedure.” Id. (quoting MINN. R. CIV. P. 81.01(c)). Since the court
found that section 145.482 was procedural in nature, Rule 6.02 superseded it to
provide an extension. Id.
89. See 457 N.W.2d 188 (Minn. 1990).
90. Id. at 189.
91. Id. at 189–90.
92. Id. at 190.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Id. at 192.
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contained empty conclusions, such as that the defendant “failed to
properly evaluate” and “failed to properly diagnose.” The court
96
held that there was malpractice without a causal connection.
97
Nevertheless, the court did not dismiss the lawsuit. The court
noted that the defendants removed their motion to compel answers
98
after receiving the plaintiff’s answers. From the plaintiff’s
99
perspective, this signaled that the answers were satisfactory. But
instead, the defendants surprised them by waiting out the 180 days
100
and filing a motion to dismiss.
Because of the defendants’
behavior, the court ruled they were “estopped from receiving a
101
procedural dismissal.”
Sorenson made two significant observations in dicta that
became perhaps the most influential parts of the case. First,
Sorenson noted that the plaintiff in the case could have easily
102
offered a more detailed affidavit. Consequently, Sorenson offered
a disclosure standard for future cases where the plaintiff had “no
103
valid reason” for the defective affidavit. After Sorenson, a proper
disclosure requires a statement on the appropriate standard of
care, the alleged negligent act, and a causal connection between
104
the negligent act and the plaintiff’s damages.
Second, Sorenson recognized there are “borderline cases”: cases
where the plaintiff makes a good faith effort to identify the expert
and provide “some meaningful disclosure of what the testimony will
105
be,” but the disclosure is not substantively adequate. Sorenson
recognized that a mechanical application of the statute could
106
dismiss meritorious cases in this category. Sorenson, therefore,
made an opening for the court to consider more than the statute’s

96. Id. at 192–93 (quoting language from the plaintiff’s second affidavit).
97. Id. at 193.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 190.
101. Id. at 193 (citing Thorson v. Rice Cty. Dist. One Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 410,
416 (Minn. 1989)).
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.; see also House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (D. Minn. 2000)
(defining borderline cases as “situations in which an affidavit is submitted in good
faith, but is not deemed substantively sufficient . . . .”).
106. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.
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107

language in its analysis. Plaintiffs could avoid dismissal if affidavits
were filed in good faith—as long as the affidavit did not
108
significantly prejudice the defendant.
In place of outright
dismissal, Sorenson suggested imposing lesser sanctions, such as
allowing the defendant to depose the plaintiff’s expert at the
plaintiff’s expense or restricting testimony to the affidavit’s
109
content.
Another significant medical malpractice case that followed
110
Sorenson is Stroud v. Hennepin County Medical Center.
Stroud
dismissed the plaintiff’s lawsuit, but the decision was arguably
consistent with Sorenson because the plaintiff had plenty of warning
111
to remedy the affidavit.
2.

No Second Chances: Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc.

At the turn of the century, the court moved away from
Sorenson’s concern over meritorious lawsuits and more towards a
concern over frivolous lawsuits, which led to a stricter application

107. House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1053 (“[T]he Court has left an opening in
which the court can take an alternative action to mandatory dismissal and allow a
case to proceed on the merits.”).
108. Id. at 1052 (citing Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193).
109. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.
110. 556 N.W.2d 552 (Minn. 1996).
111. See id. at 556. In Stroud, a woman went to the hospital three times in
eight days with medical issues. Id. at 553. She was examined and sent home twice.
Id. The third time she was admitted after suffering a hemorrhage and died just
over two weeks later in the hospital. Id. Her estate sued, and there were two
defendants: a hospital and a medical group. Id. A few months into the lawsuit, the
hospital served interrogatories on the plaintiff requesting a causal explanation for
the malpractice claim. Id. at 554. The plaintiff answered by simply referring the
defendant back to the first affidavit in the complaint. Id. The hospital again served
formal interrogatories and also sent two letters to the plaintiff requesting a causal
explanation. Id. The 180-day deadline passed without a further submission from
the plaintiff. Id. Once again, the hospital attempted to elicit interrogatory
answers—this time with a motion to compel answers—but the plaintiff again
referred back to the initial affidavit. Id. The plaintiff eventually filed a new
affidavit, but the hospital joined a motion for summary judgment that the medical
group had already filed. Id. at 555. The supreme court upheld the district court’s
original granting of this motion, noting not only that the initial affidavit was
conclusory under Sorenson but also that the plaintiff’s failure to provide an
adequate affidavit was “especially troubling” because of the multiple attempts the
hospital made to obtain a proper affidavit. Id. at 556.
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113

of the statute. Lindberg v. Health Partners, Inc. started this line of
114
cases.
In Lindberg, a pregnant patient contacted her health care
115
provider three times within roughly twenty-four hours. She first
called about leg swelling and later called with further
116
117
complications. She was told to stay home both times. The third
118
time she called, the provider advised her to go to the hospital.
119
A medical
Later that day, her baby was delivered stillborn.
malpractice lawsuit ensued, and the plaintiff timely submitted both
120
expert affidavits that section 145.682 requires.
The court dismissed the case because the second affidavit
contained “nothing more than broad and conclusory statements as
121
to causation.” The affidavit noted that the provider’s “failure to
instruct Ms. Lindberg to seek prompt medical attention . . . caused
122
the death of [Ms. Lindberg’s child].” However, this statement did
not outline a chain of causation tracing the provider’s negligent act
123
to the child’s death. Following Sorenson’s disclosure standard, the
Lindberg court noted that a proper affidavit disclosure requires, in
part, a causal connection between the negligent act and the
124
plaintiff’s damages. Because this was missing, the court dismissed
125
the case. In reaching this decision, Lindberg explicitly stated that
there is no exception to excuse an affidavit that “fall[s] short” of
126
the substantive requirement for statements on causation. This
contrasts with Sorenson’s approach to borderline cases, which
127
considers the plaintiff’s good faith.
112. See Leo, supra note 56, at 1400–01 (noting that Lindberg set the trend for
dismissal of meritorious claims over technicalities in affidavits).
113. 599 N.W.2d 572 (Minn. 1999).
114. See Leo, supra note 56, at 1400–01.
115. See Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 573–74.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 574.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 577–78.
122. Id. at 577.
123. Id. at 578.
124. Id. at 577 (citing Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188,
193 (Minn. 1990)).
125. Id. at 579.
126. Id. at 578.
127. See House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052–53 (D. Minn. 2000)
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In reaching its decision, the Lindberg court steered away from
Sorenson’s concern for meritorious cases and focused narrowly on
the legislature’s intent to eliminate frivolous cases:
Dismissal is mandated under [section 145.682] when the
disclosure requirements are not met and while we
certainly recognize that the statute may have harsh results
in some cases, it cuts with a sharp but clean edge. It is the
legislative choice to implement the policy of eliminating frivolous
128
medical malpractice lawsuits by dismissal.
Thus, the court directly connected the dismissal to the legislature’s
goal of eliminating frivolous cases.
The Lindberg decision was in stark contrast with Sorenson.
Lindberg followed Sorenson’s requirements for a proper affidavit
disclosure but did not consider Sorenson’s mitigating factor of good
faith that could prevent outright dismissal in potentially
meritorious cases. As the dissent noted, “This was not the ‘frivolous
litigation’ that [section 145.682] was intended to remedy, rather it
is one of those borderline cases where counsel retained a qualified
expert and made a good faith effort to disclose meaningful
129
information of what the expert testimony would be.” By ignoring
the mitigating factor of good faith, Lindberg shifted the court’s
jurisprudence away from a concern over meritorious lawsuits and
130
towards a narrow concern for frivolous lawsuits.
Less than a year after Lindberg, the court decided another
medical malpractice case with the same narrow concern for
131
frivolous lawsuits. The discussion below explores how this trend
spilled over into non-medical malpractice case law.
(citing Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d 188).
128. Lindberg, 599 N.W.2d at 578 (emphasis added).
129. Id. at 580 (Gilbert, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
130. This is perhaps best demonstrated by the last sentence of Justice
Anderson’s concurring opinion in Lindberg, where he noted that “[this decision] is
a harsh result, especially in light of the personal tragedy suffered by the Lindberg
family, nevertheless, it is a result mandated by the law based on the record before
us.” Id. at 579 (Anderson, J., concurring specially).
131. See Anderson v. Rengachary, 608 N.W.2d 843 (Minn. 2000). In Anderson,
A doctor performed surgery that caused a woman to suffer nerve severing and
swelling. Id. at 845. The plaintiff sued the doctor, and her lawyer timely filed both
affidavits. Id. The doctor waited out the 180-day deadline and then moved to
dismiss the lawsuit on the basis that the second affidavit was defective. Id. The
district court granted this motion because the affidavit provided no causal
connection between the doctor’s negligent act and the woman’s injury. Id. The
court of appeals reversed the district court, finding that the woman filed the
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The Most Recent Case Law on Sections 544.42 and 145.682:
Brown-Wilbert and Wesely
132

Brown-Wilbert arose out of a father-and-son-owned business.
The business used an accounting firm to help in an acquisition of
another company, but the firm allegedly acted as the father’s
133
personal accountant and contrary to the son’s interests. This
134
allegedly resulted in numerous damages to the company; for
example, the firm “allowed [the father] to misappropriate
135
hundreds of thousands of dollars of [the company’s] money.”
The son first sued his father in a shareholder rights action,
resulting in the son buying out all of the father’s company shares in
136
a settlement. With the son controlling the company, the company
137
sued for accounting malpractice.
Brown-Wilbert affirmed the dismissal of an action for accounting
malpractice because the requirements for the second affidavit were
138
unfulfilled. In a response to an interrogatory requesting the
grounds for expert opinion, the plaintiff named two experts and
answered that they were “expected to testify as to the conclusions
139
set forth in the Complaint.” This response contained no new
140
Similar to
information besides the names of two experts.
Sorenson’s interpretation that conclusory statements do not satisfy
141
the second affidavit requirements under section 145.682, Brownaffidavits in good faith and had no notice that the second affidavit was insufficient
before the 180 days expired. Anderson v. Rengachary, 591 N.W.2d 511, 513 (Minn.
Ct. App. 1999), rev’d, 608 N.W.2d 843. The Minnesota Supreme Court reversed,
holding that “[n]o language in [section 145.682] suggests that a plaintiff is
entitled to notice of the insufficiency of the affidavit prior to the expiration of the
180 days,” and that the court of appeals “created a good-faith exception to the
statute of uncertain proportions.” Anderson, 608 N.W.2d at 849.
132. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 212–13
(Minn. 2007).
133. Id. at 213.
134. Id.
135. Complaint ¶ 54, Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., No. A05340 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005), 2005 WL 3111959.
136. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., No. A05-340, 2005 WL
3111959, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Nov. 22, 2005), aff’d on other grounds, 732 N.W.2d
209 (Minn. 2007).
137. See id.
138. Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 219–20.
139. Id. at 214.
140. See id.
141. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 190 (Minn.
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Wilbert held that the conclusory allegations made in the
interrogatory answers did not meet the minimum standards under
142
section 544.42. As interpreted by Brown-Wilbert, the minimum
standards for a proper disclosure are that the second affidavit must
contain (1) the expert’s identity and (2) the expert’s opinion
143
supporting the elements of a prima facie malpractice case. The
court applied this standard objectively to determine whether to
grant the plaintiff sixty days of safe harbor or grant pretrial
144
dismissal of the case. Although the plaintiff in Brown-Wilbert met
145
the first requirement by identifying experts, there were only
146
conclusory statements to support the opinion. Consequently, the
147
court dismissed the action.
Sorenson and Lindberg both influenced the Brown-Wilbert
decision. Brown-Wilbert explicitly stated that it was influenced by
148
Sorenson’s discussion of “borderline cases” and adopted Sorenson’s
opening for extra-statutory considerations by implementing
149
However, one
minimum standards for the second affidavit.
notable difference between the cases is that Brown-Wilbert’s
150
standards are strictly objective,
while Sorenson considers the
plaintiff’s good faith balanced against the prejudice the defendant
151
may sustain from allowing an affidavit remedy. Because Brown-

1990) (citing MINN. STAT. § 145.682, subdiv. 2(2) (2014)).
142. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d. at 219.
143. Id. These standards are considered objectively; subjective intent to submit
an affidavit in good faith is irrelevant. Id. at 216. But see House v. Kelbel, 105 F.
Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (stating that courts can take alternative action to dismissal
when an affidavit is “submitted in good faith”).
144. Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 218–19.
145. Id. at 214.
146. Id. at 219.
147. Id. at 219–20.
148. Id. at 219.
149. See id.; see also House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1053 (D. Minn.
2000) (noting that Sorenson “left an opening in which the court can take an
alternative action to mandatory dismissal and allow a case to proceed on the
merits”); Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr., 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.
1990).
150. Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216 (holding that the statutory
requirements are objective).
151. House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1052 (“In dicta, the Sorenson Court
acknowledged that mandatory dismissal of a suit in which a party provides a
substantively deficient affidavit in good faith might be a harsh result.”).
Specifically, Sorenson suggested that dismissal may not be appropriate if the
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Wilbert rejected a good faith standard and set its own objective
152
standards, the case marks a significant difference with Sorenson.
Brown-Wilbert also makes no mention of Sorenson’s discussion of
lesser sanctions than outright dismissal, such as allowing the
defendant to depose the plaintiff’s expert at the plaintiff’s
153
expense. This was likely omitted because Brown-Wilbert followed
Lindberg’s lead in following the legislature’s original intent of the
154
statute to dismiss frivolous cases. Towards this end, Brown-Wilbert
connected its decision to dismiss the case to the legislature’s intent
to eliminate frivolous cases:
[I]f we look to the purpose for section 544.42, to provide
a mechanism for the early dismissal of frivolous actions,
the minimum standards for such an affidavit should be
that it contains meaningful information on each of the
issues for which expert testimony will be required at trial
155
to avoid a directed verdict.
By way of contrast, in the first medical malpractice case
interpreting section 145.682’s safe harbor provision, the Wesely v.
Flor court declined to extend Brown-Wilbert and took an entirely new
156
approach to interpreting the statute. Looking at the safe harbor
provision’s plain language, the Wesely court determined that any
timely affidavit would automatically be granted forty-five days of
157
safe harbor upon a motion to dismiss. The Wesely court reasoned
that, on a plain reading of the statute, the court plays no role in
determining the adequacy of the second affidavit before safe
158
harbor is exhausted.
After Wesely, a question remained as to whether the
discrepancy between Wesely and Brown-Wilbert is justified. Wesely
maintained that its holding did not overrule Brown-Wilbert because
the court identifies the deficiencies in the affidavit under section
544.42; under section 145.682, the defendant identifies the

plaintiff provides some “meaningful disclosure” and the defendant is not severely
prejudiced by the defective affidavit. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.
152. Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216–18.
153. See Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.
154. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 217.
155. Id. at 218 (emphasis added).
156. See 806 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2011).
157. Id. (“[Section 145.682] does not limit the safe-harbor period to only
certain types of deficiencies.”).
158. Id. at 42–43.
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deficiencies. Thus, under Wesely, the court plays a role in section
160
544.42 in a way that it does not in section 145.682. However,
despite section 544.42’s reference to the court’s role in identifying
deficiencies, it is not entirely clear how section 544.42 allows the
161
court to deny safe harbor strictly because of a defective affidavit.
Amidst this background, the Minnesota Supreme Court
decided Guzick v. Kimball. Because Guzick was a legal malpractice
case, section 544.42 controlled. Consequently, it was likely that
Guzick would follow Brown-Wilbert’s interpretation of section 544.42.
But Guzick presented a new challenge: it was the supreme court’s
first legal malpractice case interpreting section 544.42; as such, it
was unclear what elements of legal malpractice required expert
support. Moreover, although Wesely was not controlling, it was
lurking in the background with a radically different holding on a
virtually identical statute. It remained to be seen whether the court
would take steps to address this discrepancy.
III. THE GUZICK DECISION
A.

Facts and Procedural History

Colleen Bennett (“Bennett”) was the legal assistant of attorney
162
Larry Kimball (“Kimball”) at Kimball Law Office. In 2008, Louis
Nyberg, Jr. (“Tony”) asked Bennett to draft a power of attorney
form that would allow Tony to act as attorney-in-fact on behalf of
163
his uncle, George Nyberg (“George”).
Per office procedure, Bennett printed a standard form and
164
filled in George’s information.
The form contained a prechecked box that would allow Tony full access to all of George’s
165
property. Bennett gave the form to Tony, who obtained George’s
166
signature. However, neither Bennett nor Kimball, as Bennett’s

159. Id. at 41–42.
160. See id.
161. This was central to the dissent in Brown-Wilbert, which argued that the
case should have been allowed to proceed on the basis of good faith. BrownWilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 228 (Minn. 2007)
(Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
162. Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 44 (Minn. 2015).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Id.
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supervisor, determined whether George read and understood the
167
168
form. In fact, Kimball did not even see the form.
In early 2009, Tony used the power of attorney form at a Wells
Fargo branch to add his name to two of George’s bank accounts as
169
a joint owner with a right of survivorship. A few days later, George
170
died. Around this time—before and after George’s death—Tony
171
transferred $226,524 to bank accounts he shared with his wife.
Representing George’s estate, Timothy Guzick sued Kimball
for legal malpractice and alleged that Kimball had a duty to
supervise Bennett and also had an independent duty to meet with
George to discuss the legal consequences of the power of
172
attorney. Kimball moved for summary judgment against Guzick’s
claims on the basis that Guzick did not provide a satisfactory
affidavit of expert disclosure within the required 180-day
173
timeframe. Although Guzick referenced the affidavit of expert
review in answering Kimball’s interrogatories, Kimball argued that
this was inadequate because the expert’s opinion was conclusory
and did not establish any of the four elements of legal
174
malpractice.
The district court agreed with Kimball and granted the motion
175
for summary judgment. It held that Guzick’s answers to Kimball’s
interrogatories were “grossly deficient in meeting the statutory
176
requirements.” The court also held that all four elements of legal
malpractice should have been supported by expert opinion and
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 44–45. Before suing Kimball, Guzick sued Tony and Tony’s wife for
conversion. Id. at 44. They filed for bankruptcy, and Guzick won a sum in
bankruptcy court. Id. Guzick also sued Wells Fargo. Id. Wells Fargo settled the
case. Brief of Appellants Larry Alan Kimball, Kimball Law Off., and Kimball and
Undem, Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42 (2015) (No. A14-0429), 2015 WL
1070344, at *4. One of Kimball’s defenses was that these previous lawsuits showed
the damages were the result of third parties, and therefore, Kimball could not be
liable. Id. at *8.
173. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 45; see also MINN. STAT. § 544.42 (2016).
174. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 45–46.
175. Guzick v. Kimball, No. 11-CV-13-689, 2014 WL 9963420, at *2 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 3, 2014), rev’d, No. A14-0429, 2014 WL 4957973 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct.
6, 2014), rev’d, 869 N.W.2d 42 (Minn. 2015).
176. Id. at *2.
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177

that Guzick supported none of them. In finding that all four
elements required expert support, the court noted that a lay juror
could not understand how the facts of the case establish any
178
element of legal malpractice.
Guzick appealed the decision, and the court of appeals
179
reversed. The court first noted that expert support is generally
not required to prove the first element of legal malpractice, the
180
existence of an attorney-client relationship. Next, the court stated
that the remaining three elements—a negligent act, but-for cause,
and proximate cause—generally require expert testimony and that
only “exceptional” or “rare” cases will not require expert testimony
181
for these elements.
However, the court held that this case
182
presented an exception for establishing a but-for cause. This is
because “lay-witness testimony” could establish pertinent questions
relating to cause-in-fact issues, such as whether Wells Fargo or Tony
183
was the but-for cause of George’s damages. Consequently, the
court held that expert opinion was only required to fulfill two
elements of legal malpractice: a negligent act and proximate
184
causation. Finally, the court held that Guzick’s affidavit was
185
sufficient to satisfy these two elements.
B.

The Minnesota Supreme Court’s Decision

Kimball appealed the court of appeals’ decision, and the
Minnesota Supreme Court reversed on the basis that Guzick’s
second affidavit was conclusory and failed the Brown-Wilbert
186
standards. First, the court noted that Guzick procedurally met the
180-day limit on the second affidavit by answering Kimball’s
187
interrogatories. As such, Guzick potentially qualified for statutory
safe harbor, which would have required the court to give him

177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
2009)).
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id. at *3.
Id.
Guzick, 2014 WL 4957973, at *1.
Id. at *3.
Id. (citing Fontaine v. Steen, 759 N.W.2d 672, 677 (Minn. Ct. App.
Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *11.
Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 51–52 (Minn. 2015).
Id. at 48.
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notice of deficiencies in the affidavit and sixty days to remedy those
188
deficiencies. As a result, Brown-Wilbert applied, and the court
189
considered whether Guzick satisfied the minimum standards.
Guzick plainly satisfied the first Brown-Wilbert element: disclosure of
190
the expert to be called upon. Consequently, the case hinged on
the outcome of a two-step process: The court had to determine (1)
which elements of legal malpractice required expert opinion, and
(2) whether Guzick’s affidavit was satisfactory for each of these
191
elements under Brown-Wilbert.
Generally, the court noted that it considers each element of
192
malpractice on a “case-by-case” basis. First, expert opinion is
193
generally always required to establish a negligent act. Since this
case presented no exception, the court required expert opinion on
194
this element. However, because the parties did not dispute that
195
the affidavit established a negligent act, this was not part of the
court’s analysis.
The court held that the other three elements of legal
malpractice—but-for cause, proximate cause, and the existence of
an attorney-client relationship—do not generally require expert
196
support. This holding directly rejected the court of appeals’
position that both causation elements typically require expert
197
support as a general rule. The court reasoned that the court of
appeals unjustifiably relied on medical malpractice case law to
198
derive its rule. Rather than provide a general rule with a lay juror
exception, the court asked whether the facts relating to an element
are “within an area of common knowledge and lay comprehension
188. MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016).
189. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 48.
190. Id.
191. See id. at 49–50 (stating the main issue as whether or not the affidavit was
satisfactory for the elements requiring expert opinion).
192. Id. at 48–49.
193. Id. at 49.
194. Id.
195. See id. at 49–50 (noting that the parties dispute whether the “expert
disclosure . . . satisfied Brown-Wilbert’s standard for but-for causation, proximate
causation, and the existence of an attorney-client relationship”).
196. See id. at 50 (quoting Tousignant v. St. Louis Cty., 615 N.W.2d 53, 58
(Minn. 2000)) (“Although legal malpractice claims may involve complex causation
issues, ‘complex issues of science or technology’ are generally not found in legal
malpractice cases.”).
197. Id. (citing Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 58).
198. Id. (citing Tousignant, 615 N.W.2d at 58).
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such that they can be adequately evaluated by a jury in the absence
199
of an expert.”
Applying this method, the court found that an expert was not
200
required to establish but-for cause. The court reasoned that a lay
juror could make causal inferences about whether Kimball’s
negligent acts were a but-for cause of the overbroad power of
attorney form and whether this form was a but-for cause of the
201
vulnerability of George’s funds. Consequently, the court did not
consider the second step of the process: whether but-for cause was
satisfactory under Brown-Wilbert.
Next, the court considered proximate cause, and this is what
decided the case. Notably, Guzick did not dispute that expert
certification was required for proximate cause, which is perhaps the
202
only reason the court required it. Since expert support was
required for proximate cause, Brown-Wilbert applied, and the court
ruled that Guzick’s second affidavit was plainly conclusory because
203
it only stated that Kimball’s negligent acts “caused damages.”
Consequently, this defect in the affidavit precluded Guzick from
204
safe harbor under Brown-Wilbert.
Finally, because the affidavit was already deemed defective, the
court considered it unnecessary to discuss the requirements for an
205
attorney-client relationship. Thus, the court only required an
206
expert to establish a negligent act and proximate cause.
IV. ANALYSIS
This section begins by placing Guzick in the historical context
discussed in Part II. When deciding whether to grant safe harbor
for a defective affidavit, Guzick followed Brown-Wilbert’s minimum
199. Id. (citing Hill v. Okay Constr. Co., 312 Minn. 324, 337, 252 N.W.2d 107,
116 (1977)).
200. Id. at 50–51.
201. Id. at 50.
202. Id. Justice Lillehaug noted in his concurring opinion that if Guzick had
not agreed that an expert was required for proximate cause, “it would have been a
close call as to whether an expert was necessary to establish proximate cause under
the facts of this case.” Id. at 52 (Lillehaug, J., concurring).
203. Id. at 51 (majority opinion) (noting that Guzick should not be allowed
safe harbor because he had been pursuing other lawsuits, which were based on the
same facts, for multiple years).
204. Id. at 51–52; see also MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016).
205. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 48 n.5.
206. Id. at 48.
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standards and did not consider the plaintiff’s good faith. The
discussion in this section explores how this approach runs counter
to the legislature’s intent to avoid dismissing meritorious cases. To
demonstrate how Brown-Wilbert can dismiss meritorious cases, this
section traces the procedural history of Wesely through the district
court and the court of appeals.
The analysis then shifts to the Minnesota Supreme Court’s
decision in Wesely, which reversed the court of appeals and declined
208
to extend Brown-Wilbert to medical malpractice. This created
tension between Wesely and Brown-Wilbert because the cases’
underlying statutes—sections 145.682 and 544.42, respectively—
209
have only minor differences. None of these differences, however,
210
Consequently,
lend support to the Brown-Wilbert standards.
Wesley’s approach, which follows the plain language of the statute,
211
makes more sense.
Finally, this section ends with a discussion on how the BrownWilbert standards will not provide fair warning to plaintiffs before
their claims are dismissed. This is not only unfair, but it may also
have a detrimental impact on the public’s perception of the legal
profession.
A.

Guzick’s Historical Foundation Runs Against Legislative Intent

Guzick followed the Brown-Wilbert minimum standards for the
212
second expert affidavit in non-medical malpractice actions. In
establishing these standards, Brown-Wilbert claimed to be influenced
213
by Sorenson’s discussion of “borderline cases.” In the medical
malpractice context, Sorenson attempted to ease the crudeness of an
“all or nothing” application of section 145.682 in potentially
214
meritorious cases. Plaintiffs could avoid dismissal if affidavits were
filed in good faith and as long as they did not prejudice the
207.
2007).
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.
2007).
214.
1990).

Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 216 (Minn.
Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 44 (Minn. 2011).
Compare MINN. STAT. § 145.682, with id. § 544.42.
See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53 (Lillehaug, J., concurring).
Id.
Id. at 47 (majority opinion).
Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 219 (Minn.
See Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr. 457 N.W.2d 188, 193 (Minn.
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215

defendant. In such cases, Sorenson offered a middle ground and
216
suggested lesser sanctions for plaintiffs than outright dismissal.
Sorenson, therefore, made an opening for the court to go beyond
217
the statute in borderline cases.
Brown-Wilbert adopted Sorenson’s opening for extra-statutory
considerations, but then it rejected Sorenson’s good faith standard
218
This is
and set its own objective “minimum standards.”
problematic for two reasons. First, by invoking Sorenson, BrownWilbert takes us back to Sorenson’s time, before there was a safe
219
harbor provision. Sorenson’s application is therefore questionable
because section 145.682 is more favorable to plaintiffs after the
addition of safe harbor, and section 544.42 has always had safe
220
harbor. Second, Brown-Wilbert actually adds an additional burden
for plaintiffs by switching out good faith for detailed objective
221
standards.
Consequently, it is probable that Brown-Wilbert’s
standards, which burden plaintiffs despite section 544.42’s safe
harbor provision, are even harsher than Sorenson’s approach, which
the court used before safe harbor even existed for section
222
145.682. Thus, the Brown-Wilbert standards arguably run against
215. House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1052 (D. Minn. 2000) (citing
Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193).
216. Sorenson, 457 N.W.2d at 193.
217. House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1053.
218. Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 216–18.
219. See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 54 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J.,
concurring).
220. See id. (citing Act of May 22, 2002, ch. 403, § 1, 2002 Minn. Laws 1706,
1706–07) (noting that there is “no real value” to citing medical malpractice cases
that were decided before safe harbor was even enacted).
221. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 227 (Anderson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (noting that Brown-Wilbert’s approach is much narrower
than Sorenson’s standard and that Brown-Wilbert causes “great potential for
unfairness and unduly harsh results”).
222. See id. Also consider the fact that Guzick’s affidavit was dismissed despite
containing ten specific departures from the standard of care. Respondent’s Brief,
Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42 (No. A14-0429), 2015 WL 1070341, at *29. For
example, Mr. Kimball “failed to supervise [his legal assistant] . . . in the drafting of
the [Power of Attorney form]” and “failed to meet and talk with George Nyberg”
to assess his legal competency and why he wanted an attorney-in-fact. Id. at *27.
This is arguably more detailed than the affidavit in Sorenson, where it vaguely noted
that a fetal anomaly “should have been apparent” to the doctor on duty and that
the doctor on duty “failed to properly diagnose” fetal distress and “failed to take
proper steps” to deliver the baby. Sorenson v. St. Paul Ramsey Med. Ctr. 457
N.W.2d 188, 192 (Minn. 1990). The affidavits in Sorenson and Guzick were both
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the legislature’s intent for safe harbor to prevent dismissals of
223
meritorious cases. As the next section explores, this potential for
dismissing meritorious cases is very real.
B.

Brown-Wilbert and Guzick Might Lead to Unjust Outcomes and
Dispose of Meritorious Lawsuits
224

The facts and procedural history of Wesely v. Flor provide a
good example of how Guzick and Brown-Wilbert might dismiss
meritorious cases. While Ms. Wesely was receiving dental care, the
225
power went out and her dentist became distracted. Consequently,
226
the dentist’s drill damaged Ms. Wesely’s teeth and lip. The dentist
227
then tried to repair the damage. While doing so, the dentist
allegedly rested his hand on her jaw and forced her jaw into various
228
abnormal directions. The pressure allegedly displaced her jaw
229
and caused disfigurement. Consequently, Ms. Wesely sued the
230
dentist and the dental office.
To make matters worse for Ms. Wesely, her attorney withdrew
from the case eighty-three days before the 180-day deadline for
231
submitting a second affidavit. The attorney had Ms. Wesely’s
medical records, and Ms. Wesely did not receive the records until
232
twenty days before the expiration of the 180-day deadline. With
no attorney, Ms. Wesely acted pro se, finding an expert and serving
233
the second affidavit eleven days before the deadline. Ms. Wesely
met with a new attorney two days after the 180-day deadline passed,
and the new attorney told her the expert supporting the submitted
deemed insufficient. Guzick, 2015 WL 1070341, at *29; Sorenson, 457
N.W.2d at 193. However, Guzick’s affidavit was arguably much more detailed.
223. For example, the point of adding a safe harbor provision to section
145.682 was to ease a civil procedure that was “too strict.” MINN. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 58.
224. Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011).
225. Id. at 38.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix at 1, Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583
(Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (No. A10–478), 2010 WL 5493722.
232. Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583, 589 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806
N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011).
233. See id. at 585.
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affidavit might not be suitable because he was not a dentist.
Shortly after this, the defendant moved to dismiss the lawsuit over a
235
deficient affidavit. Within forty-five days of this motion, Ms.
Wesely, now represented by the new lawyer, served a new affidavit
236
with a new expert.
In the district court, Ms. Wesely argued that her first lawyer’s
withdrawal and the subsequent delay in receiving her medical
records should provide her with an extension on the basis of
237
excusable neglect. She also argued that she “did her best,”
implying that her good-faith effort, combined with the pressing
238
circumstances, should grant her an extension.
The district court rejected Ms. Wesely’s arguments. The court
noted that the expert’s identity is the most important part of the
239
affidavit, and because the new affidavit had a new expert, it could
240
not amend the previous affidavit.
On this basis, the court
241
dismissed the lawsuit with prejudice.
In its decision, the district court acknowledged the merit of
242
Ms. Wesely’s case.
The district court specifically stated that
“despite a deficient expert affidavit, it appears that the Plaintiff has
243
a reasonable suit on the merits.” The court also stated it was
“sympathetic to [Ms. Wesely], but that does not allow the court to
244
bend what is a strict and clear time limit under the statute.”
The district court’s argument runs against legislative intent. If
Ms. Wesely’s case was “app[arently] . . . reasonable . . . on the
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. See id. The new expert pointed to the dentist’s negligent failure to refer
Ms. Wesely to “immediate medical care” after displacing her jaw. Appellant’s Brief
and Appendix at 8, Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010) (No.
A10-478), 2010 WL 5493722. The new expert also stated that there “is limited
expectation that treatment will ever restore [Ms. Wesely’s] jaw to its pre-trauma
condition” and noted Ms. Wesely’s “constant, consistent and persistent pain.” Id.
237. See Wesely v. Flor, No. 24-CV-09-1592, 2010 WL 5577258, at *9 (Minn.
Dist. Ct. Jan. 21, 2010), aff’d, 791 N.W.2d 583 (Minn. Ct. App. 2010), rev’d, 806
N.W.2d 36 (Minn. 2011).
238. See id.
239. Id. at *10.
240. Id. at *7 (“[The statute] does not state that a new affidavit by a new
expert is an acceptable method of curing the deficiencies.”).
241. Id. at *10.
242. Id. at *9.
243. Id.
244. Id. at *7.
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merits,” her case could not have been frivolous. And because
her case was not frivolous, allowing it to proceed would have
247
aligned with the legislature’s intent to stop frivolous cases.
Moreover, the 2002 safe harbor provision was enacted to prevent
248
meritorious cases from being dismissed. Here, the court admitted
249
the lawsuit was probably meritorious but still dismissed the case.
This interpretation of section 145.682 is not what the legislature
intended.
The situation did not improve in the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. In Wesely, the court of appeals not only upheld the district
court’s decision, it found further support for the district court’s
conclusion in Brown-Wilbert:
[Ms. Wesely] also argues that she made a good-faith effort
to comply with [section 145.682]. But the Brown-Wilbert
court declined to adopt a good-faith standard for
complying with [section 544.42, subdivision 4], because it
would inject a subjective element into the requirements
for an affidavit of expert [disclosure]. The district court
did not abuse its discretion in declining to extend the 180day period to allow appellant to submit an expert250
disclosure affidavit.

245. Id. at *9.
246. Frivolous Claim, BLACK’S, supra note 1 (defining a frivolous claim as “[a]
claim that has no legal basis or merit, esp[ecially] one brought for an
unreasonable purpose such as harassment” (citing Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b))).
247. See Clark et al., supra note 42.
248. See MINN. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, supra note 58; see also BrownWilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 217 (Minn. 2007) (citing S.
Deb. on S.F. 0936, 82d Minn. Leg. (May 16, 2001) (statement of Sen. Neuville)).
249. See Wesely, 2010 WL 5577258, at *10–11.
250. Wesely, 791 N.W.2d at 589 (citation omitted). Readers should note that
the language in this quote was altered by the author to correct two small errors in
the court’s opinion. The court’s opinion incorrectly states that Brown-Wilbert
“declined to adopt a good-faith standard for complying with [section] 544.42,
subd[ivision] 3, because it would inject a subjective element into the requirements
for an affidavit of expert review.” Id. (emphasis added). The Brown-Wilbert court
made it clear that it declined to adopt good faith for the affidavit of expert
disclosure, which is in subdivision 4 of section 544.42, not subdivision 3. The BrownWilbert opinion reads: “We decline to adopt a ‘good faith’ standard because it
would inject a subjective element into the requirements for an affidavit of expert
disclosure. . . . [W]e read section 544.42, subdivision 4, to describe objective
requirements for an affidavit of expert disclosure . . . .” Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at
216 (emphasis added).
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By referencing the Minnesota Supreme Court decision of BrownWilbert, the court of appeals authoritatively disposed of Ms. Wesely’s
251
good-faith intentions and arguably disposed a meritorious lawsuit
252
as a result. The court isolated the issue to the affidavit defects
alone. Notably, the court did not consider Ms. Wesely’s lawyer who
253
withdrew from representation, her receipt of the medical records
254
twenty days before the 180-day deadline, her pro se attempt to
255
timely file the affidavit after being unable to find a new attorney,
and her retention of a new attorney as soon as she could find
256
one.
To proceed with her claim under the pressing
circumstances, Ms. Wesely had to act pro se and file the affidavit
herself despite allegedly suffering “constant, consistent and
257
persistent pain.” These facts minimally establish Ms. Wesely’s
good faith effort to appropriately file the second affidavit. BrownWilbert’s minimum standards do not account for this effort. As a
result, if the story ended here, Brown-Wilbert’s influence would have
provided extra credibility and authority to dispose of what was
arguably a meritorious lawsuit.
C.

Guzick Should Have Rejected Brown-Wilbert and Followed the Plain
Statutory Language of Section 544.42

Ms. Wesely’s story did not end at the court of appeals. In 2011,
the Minnesota Supreme Court declined to extend Brown-Wilbert to
258
medical malpractice in Wesely v. Flor. The court reasoned that,
under the plain language of section 145.682, the triggering of the
forty-five day safe harbor period is entirely procedural and
259
automatic. Thus, there is no place for a substantive Brown-Wilbert
260
analysis of an affidavit’s content. In contrast, under section
251. See Fid. Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U.S. 169, 178 (1940) (citing Beals v.
Hale, 45 U.S. 37, 54 (1846)) (“The highest state court is the final authority on
state law.”); Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
252. Wesely, 2010 WL 5577258, at *9 (noting that the lawsuit was “app[arently]
. . . meritorious”).
253. Appellant’s Brief and Appendix, Wesely v. Flor, 791 N.W.2d 583 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2010) (No. A10-0478), 2010 WL 5493722, at *1.
254. Wesely, 791 N.W.2d at 589.
255. Id. at 585.
256. Id.
257. Appellant’s Brief, supra note 253, at *8.
258. 806 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2011).
259. Id. at 41.
260. Id. at 42.
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544.42, the court triggers the safe harbor period and issues specific
261
Therefore, Wesely reasoned that
deficiencies in the affidavit.
262
Brown-Wilbert fits into the statutory framework of section 544.42.
Wesely is persuasive regarding the differences in the statutes.
Under section 544.42, the court identifies the deficiencies and
263
initiates the plaintiff’s sixty days of safe harbor. Under section
145.682, the defendant identifies the deficiencies and the plaintiff
has at least forty-five days to remedy the affidavit upon service of
264
the motion. In sum, the court is involved in the safe-harbor
process in section 544.42, but all references to the court are absent
265
from the plain statutory language of section 145.682.
However, under the rules of statutory interpretation, the
differences in the two statutes are not enough for Guzick to uphold
266
The first step in statutory interpretation is to
Brown-Wilbert.
determine whether the statute’s words are clear and
267
unambiguous. If the statute is unambiguous, the court applies
268
the plain meaning of the statute. Section 544.42 is clear and
unambiguous—it does not state that the court plays a substantive
269
role in granting safe harbor. Rather, subdivision 6(c) states that
“an initial motion to dismiss an action . . . shall not be granted, unless
after notice by the court, the nonmoving party is given 60 days to satisfy the
270
This plain language
disclosure requirements in subdivision 4.”
suggests that the court’s role is limited to providing notice that the
271
sixty days have started. In other words, the court does not grant
261. Id.
262. See id.
263. MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016).
264. Id. § 145.682, subdiv. 6(c)(2).
265. See Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 41.
266. See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 53 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J.,
concurring).
267. Staab v. Diocese of St. Cloud, 813 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. 2012); see MINN.
STAT. § 645.16 (“When the words of a law in their application to an existing
situation are clear and free from all ambiguity, the letter of the law shall not be
disregarded under the pretext of pursuing the spirit.”).
268. Staab, 813 N.W.2d at 73.
269. See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53; see also MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c).
270. MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (emphasis added); see also Guzick, 869
N.W.2d at 53 (citing MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c)).
271. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53. In Guzick’s only concurring opinion, Justice
Lillehaug noted that Brown-Wilbert invented the court’s authority to substantively
decide an affidavit’s merits before granting sixty days of safe harbor. Id. at 53–54.
Provided that the language of section 544.42 unambiguously provides sixty days of
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safe harbor at the time of notice; the court only notifies the plaintiff
that the clock has started ticking, and the court cannot dismiss the
272
case until the clock stops. And, while the court must identify
deficiencies in the affidavit, the plaintiff has sixty days to remedy
273
the deficiencies.
Brown-Wilbert reasoned its interpretation of the statute was
necessary because allowing affidavits with little or no content
274
“would render the 180-day requirement meaningless.” After all, a
plaintiff could submit a “placeholder” affidavit to delay submitting
275
a proper affidavit. However, Wesely convincingly explained that
this is unlikely because the first affidavit requires that the plaintiff
276
already “[be] in contact with an expert.” Therefore, the plaintiff
277
would usually have little reason to use such a tactic. Moreover,
even if a plaintiff uses this tactic, it is risky because it only leaves
sixty days to submit an affidavit, and a failure to submit an affidavit
in good faith could shift the defendant’s attorney fees and other
278
costs to the plaintiff. Finally, even if some “placeholder” affidavits
arise, this does not render the 180-day requirement meaningless.
safe harbor before a motion can be dismissed, this “judicial concoction” is
unwarranted. Id. Thus, while he reluctantly concurred with the majority’s
application of Brown-Wilbert, Justice Lillehaug argued that the court should
eventually return to the plain language of the statute. Id. at 55–56.
272. See id. at 53.
273. MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c); Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53.
274. Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 217–18
(Minn. 2007). The general rule is that, if at all possible, parts of a statute should
not be rendered meaningless. State v. Wilson, 830 N.W.2d 849, 853 (Minn. 2013)
(citing State v. Orsello, 554 N.W.2d 70, 74 (Minn. 1996), as amended on reh’g (Oct.
31, 1996)) (“In [applying the plain meaning of the statute], we interpret the
statute in a manner that renders no part of it meaningless.”); see also MINN. STAT.
§ 645.16 (“Every law shall be construed, if possible, to give effect to all its
provisions.”).
275. Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2011). Brown-Wilbert does not
explicitly express the worry that a plaintiff might submit a “placeholder” affidavit,
but it is implied. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 217–18.
276. Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 42.
277. Id.
278. Id. Subdivision 7 of sections 145.682 and 544.42 contain essentially the
same language, and both allow sanctions if the plaintiff or the plaintiff’s attorney
does not certify the “affidavit or answers to interrogatories” in good faith. Compare
MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 7, with id. § 145.682, subdiv. 7. The fact that
subdivision 7 includes answers to interrogatories, which can only serve as the
second affidavit under subdivision 4, suggests that the good faith standard for
sanctions applies to both affidavits. See Wesely, 806 N.W.2d at 42.
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Under the plain language of section 544.42, plaintiffs still must file
279
an affidavit to access the sixty days of safe harbor. Without an
280
affidavit at all, there is no safe harbor. Although the need for any
281
affidavit at all sets a low bar, it is not a meaningless bar.
Consequently, the court must apply the plain language of the
statute.
Finally, even if there is something ambiguous about the safe
harbor provision, this ambiguity can be resolved by considering the
legislative intent of section 544.42. The Senate Judiciary
Committee, which heard the bill that created section 544.42,
intended the safe harbor provision to be available for all types of
282
affidavit defects. Nothing in the bill hearing indicates that the
safe harbor provision is only available for affidavits that can pass a
test resembling the Brown-Wilbert standards.
Without statutory support, historical support, or a reason to
engage in statutory interpretation, there is no reason for BrownWilbert’s minimum standards to exist. This leaves a plain reading of
279. The statute’s plain language states that when providing notice, “the court
shall issue specific findings as to the deficiencies of the affidavit . . . .” MINN. STAT.
§ 544.42, subdiv. 6(c). This indicates that a filed affidavit must exist for a plaintiff
to potentially access safe harbor. House v. Kelbel, 105 F. Supp. 2d 1045, 1051 (D.
Minn. 2000).
280. House, 105 F. Supp. 2d at 1051.
281. Indeed, this is Wesely’s interpretation of section 145.682. Moreover, at
least one other state also agrees the low bar of “any affidavit at all” is not a
meaningless standard; Georgia’s analogous statute, which covers both medical and
non-medical malpractice, has “‘no express limitation on the nature of the alleged
defect subject to remedy.’” Gala v. Fisher, 770 S.E.2d 879, 883 (Ga. 2015) (quoting
Porquez v. Washington, 492 S.E.2d 665, 668 n.3 (Ga. 1997) (citing GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-11-9.1)).
282. A bill summary that was provided to members of the Senate Judiciary
Committee noted that “[f]ailure to comply with [section 544.42’s requirements]
would result, upon motion, in mandatory dismissal with prejudice, except that in
an initial motion to dismiss . . . based on a deficient response, the party must be given 60
days to satisfy the disclosure requirements.” KATHLEEN PONTIUS, S. COUNSEL & RESEARCH,
SUMMARY OF S.F. NO. 627 (Minn. Mar. 25, 1997) (emphasis added) (on file with
Mitchell Hamline Law Review). This summary is as clear as it can be: sixty days are
available to remedy a deficient response in an initial motion to dismiss. See id.
There is no limitation for major defects. Moreover, when the Judiciary Committee
heard the bill, Senator Cohen noted that “if there is some type of defect, minor or
otherwise, . . . the other party gets the opportunity to provide that correction.” Id.
He argued that this opportunity should be extended to medical professionals
under section 145.682. Id. All of this indicates that the legislature intended for safe
harbor to be available for all affidavit defects.
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the statute, which grants safe harbor to all plaintiffs that timely
283
submit any affidavit. Wesely acknowledges this plain reading by
granting safe harbor to all plaintiffs who timely submit any
affidavit—likely even those who do not file in good faith (but those
284
who fail to file in good faith are subject to sanctions). Wesely lets
safe harbor do its job, and the court’s non-medical malpractice case
law should, too. Guzick missed an opportunity to return the court to
the plain statutory language of section 544.42.
A legitimate question may arise at this point: why have separate
statutes for medical and non-medical malpractice if the statutes are
essentially the same? Besides the fact that section 145.682 grants
forty-five days of safe harbor and section 544.42 grants sixty days,
there is little separating the two statutes. One attractive solution to
this problem is to simply eliminate section 145.682 and place all
professionals, including medical professionals, under section
285
286
287
As potential models, Georgia
and Arizona
have
544.42.
analogous statutes covering all professionals.
D.

Following the Statute’s Plain Language Will Provide Fair Warning to
Plaintiffs and Improve Public Confidence in the Legal Profession

Guzick noted that the court should determine whether but-for
causation requires expert support by considering whether the facts
relating to but-for causation fall within an area of common
288
understanding for a lay juror.
Presumably, the court would
typically apply this standard to the legal malpractice elements of
289
attorney-client relationship and proximate cause as well.
283. Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 53 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J.,
concurring).
284. Wesely v. Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 42 (Minn. 2011).
285. Leo, supra note 56 at 1429 (“The legislature should abandon section
145.682 and allow all malpractice claims, whether against doctors or other
professionals, to be governed by statute section 544.42.”).
286. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-11-9.1 (West, Westlaw through 2016 Sess. of the Gen.
Assemb.).
287. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602 (West, Westlaw through 2016 2d Reg.
Sess. of the 52d Leg.).
288. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 50 (citing Hill v. Okay Const. Co., 312 Minn. 324,
337, 252 N.W.2d 107, 116 (1977)).
289. Guzick only indicates that expert testimony is generally required to
establish a negligent act in a legal malpractice claim. Id. at 49. Guzick distinguishes
this from the other elements of legal malpractice by stating that the court has
“never required expert testimony on the other elements of a prima facie case of
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When this inexact standard is combined with the power to
dismiss a case with prejudice under Brown-Wilbert, its immediate
application may unfairly dismiss the cases of unsuspecting
290
plaintiffs. Brown-Wilbert and Guzick do not require the court to
specify its expectations for expert opinion before deciding a
motion to dismiss with prejudice. However, plaintiffs need to know
the expectations of the presiding court and must have adequate
291
notice to abide by these expectations. After all, what falls within
the common understanding for a lay juror might change over time,
and different courts might have different interpretations. Indeed,
as the procedural history of Guzick demonstrates, the district court
and the court of appeals disagreed about what elements of a prima
292
facie legal malpractice case require expert testimony.
The
Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision in Guzick did nothing to
clarify this confusion. In fact, Guzick arguably made the confusion
worse because it rejected the rule that expert testimony is generally
293
required for both causation elements of legal malpractice.
Without this general guideline, it is now more likely that courts will
rely on the lay juror standard, leading to potentially more surprise
dismissals.
legal malpractice.” Id. Expert testimony is generally required to establish a
negligent act in a legal malpractice claim in many jurisdictions outside Minnesota.
See George L. Blum, Annotation, Admissibility and Necessity of Expert Evidence as to
Standards of Practice and Negligence in Malpractice Action Against Attorney—Conduct
Related to Procedural Issues, 59 A.L.R. 6th 1, § 3 (2010).
290. See Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 227
(Minn. 2007) (Anderson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“[C]ourts
are to consider and utilize less drastic alternatives than dismissal when a plaintiff
has identified experts and given some meaningful disclosure of the expert’s
testimony.”).
291. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (“[W]e insist that
laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the
innocent by not providing fair warning.”). Notably, Arizona’s courts have
recognized the need to provide adequate notice to plaintiffs; Arizona’s analogous
statute on legal malpractice requires courts to give “fair notice to a plaintiff and an
opportunity to cure . . . an expert deficiency.” Kaufman v. Jesser, 884 F. Supp. 2d
943, 955 (D. Ariz. 2012); see also Warner v. Sw. Desert Images, LLC, 180 P.3d 986,
994 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2008) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602, subd. E
(1999)) (“Section 12-2602(E) provides that when a trial court determines an
affidavit is required, it must ‘set a date and terms for compliance.’”).
292. See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 45–46.
293. Id. at 50 (citing Tousignant v. St. Louis Cty., 615 N.W.2d 53, 58 (Minn.
2000)).
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Beyond the problem of unfairness a lack of fair warning
imposes, plaintiffs should have fair warning in malpractice cases to
help instill public confidence in the legal profession. Often, a
malpractice case is the only way a plaintiff can recover damages
294
after her lawyer’s negligence cost her a meritorious claim. It is
bad enough that a plaintiff lost one potentially meritorious claim
and must sue her former lawyer for malpractice. But when the
plaintiff’s new attorney in the malpractice suit fails a basic
procedural requirement because of the unpredictable Brown-Wilbert
295
standards, the plaintiff might lose a second meritorious claim. By
this point, a plaintiff may have spent a small fortune and years of
296
her life in litigation. Meanwhile, the plaintiff’s first attorney not
only avoids paying for damages but also likely keeps the plaintiff’s
fee. And the new attorney collects a fee from the plaintiff. It is not a
stretch to think that the public might perceive this as lawyer
profiteering at the expense of clients.
The problem may be compared with the debate over whether
lawyers must carry malpractice insurance. An attorney’s negligence
may cost a plaintiff her claim, but if the attorney does not have
malpractice insurance, legal malpractice attorneys typically avoid
297
taking the case. On the plaintiff’s side, the end result is that she
298
may lose two meritorious claims. As a result, one position is that

294. This may present itself as a negligent failure to warn about a statute of
limitations. See, e.g., Togstad v. Vesely, Otto, Miller & Keefe, 291 N.W.2d 686, 695
(Minn. 1980).
295. As an example, a couple agreed to split their assets in a divorce
agreement. Mazzocchi v. Goldstein Law Office, P.A., No. A09-2167, 2010 WL
3463636, at *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 7, 2010). As part of the deal, the husband
kept an investment and paid out half the estimated value of the investment to his
wife, which was $33,600. Id. Less than a year later, however, the investment was
worth $185,907. Id. The woman sued the attorneys for legal malpractice in their
valuation of the investment. Id. However, her legal malpractice case was
subsequently dismissed with prejudice because her new attorney did not properly
state the former attorney’s standard of care under the Brown-Wilbert minimum
standards in the second affidavit. Id. at *4.
296. For example, in Mazzocchi, the woman obtained counsel in April 2004 for
divorce proceedings. Id. at *1. The Minnesota Court of Appeals dismissed her
legal malpractice claim with prejudice in September 2010—more than six years
later. Id. at *5.
297. Susan Saab Fortney, Law as a Profession: Examining the Role of Accountability,
40 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 177, 198 (2012) (citing Manuel R. Ramos, Legal Malpractice
Insurance: The Profession’s Dirty Little Secret, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1657, 1727 (1994)).
298. Id. (citing Robert I. Johnston & Kathryn Lease Simpson, O Brothers, O
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malpractice insurance is necessary to “maintain[] public
299
The unpredictable Brown-Wilbert
confidence” in lawyers.
standards raise the exact same concerns.
Public perception may improve if the lawyer escapes civil
liability but is appropriately disciplined. The malpractice insurance
problem and the Brown-Wilbert standards also present a similar
problem for professional discipline: Minnesota attorneys must
report whether they carry malpractice insurance annually, but they
300
do not have to actually carry malpractice insurance. Professional
responsibility boards and courts are unlikely to punish attorneys for
not carrying malpractice insurance when insurance is not required
301
and the professional rules are silent on insurance ideals.
Similarly, if a malpractice lawyer does her best with the
unpredictable Brown-Wilbert standards and nevertheless fails, it is
difficult to point to the rule of professional conduct she violated.
Perhaps the lawyer escaping civil liability in the malpractice suit can
302
be punished for unprofessional conduct, but depending on the
rules the conduct violated, the punishment may be minimal.
Because law is a self-regulated profession and it is nigh impossible
to punish lawyers for something not in the professional rules, the
public perception of Brown-Wilbert’s application may be that legal
professionals are looking the other way for their friends and
colleagues.
Considering that the current case law might lead to unjust
results and distrust in the legal profession, it makes sense to adopt
303
If the plain
the plain statutory language of section 544.42.

Sisters, Art Thou Insured?, 24 PA. LAW. 28, 30 (2002)).
299. Id. at 189 (quoting The Law Society, Professional Liability Insurance § 3.2
(July 4, 2012), http://www.lawsociety.org.uk/advice/practice-notes/professional
-indemnity-insurance).
300. See MINN. R. OF THE SUP. CT. ON LAW. REGIS. 6 (2010),
https://www.revisor.leg.state.mn.us/data/revisor/court_rules/pr/prsupr-6_2016
-03-08_01-43-03/prsupr-6.pdf.
301. For example, the Minnesota Rules of Professional Conduct are silent on
insurance standards. See generally MINN. R. OF PROF. CONDUCT (2015).
302. Notably, the lawyer does not have to be found civilly liable for the
lawyer’s unprofessional actions to be punished professionally. See In re Disciplinary
Action Against Shaughnessy, 467 N.W.2d 620, 621 (Minn. 1991) (noting that
unprofessional actions “reflect adversely on the bar, and are destructive of public
confidence in the legal profession”).
303. See Guzick v. Kimball, 869 N.W.2d 42, 53 (Minn. 2015) (Lillehaug, J.,
concurring).
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statutory language applied, plaintiffs would have sixty days to
304
remedy any defects. The plain language of section 544.42 is more
305
forgiving and less likely to dismiss meritorious lawsuits.
V. CONCLUSION
Guzick established a two-step process to determine the
adequacy of expert affidavits supporting legal malpractice claims.
First, on a case-by-case basis, courts determine which elements of
306
legal malpractice require expert support.
Second, of the
elements that require support, courts evaluate their adequacy
307
under the Brown-Wilbert minimum standards. Using this process,
Guzick held that the plaintiff provided an inadequate expert
affidavit and, as a result, dismissed the plaintiff’s case without
308
granting any time to remedy the inadequacies. This is a harsh
309
outcome that might lead to the dismissal of meritorious cases.
There is no justification for Guzick’s harsh outcome. Guzick’s
pretrial evaluative process has no reason to exist when the
legislature created an automatic one-step process—sixty days of safe
310
harbor. Moreover, the court’s evaluative role in Guzick’s process
makes its application unpredictable. In turn, this unpredictability
might unfairly dismiss meritorious cases and even reduce the
public’s trust in legal professionals. Consequently, the court should
follow the lead of Wesely in the medical malpractice context and
311
adopt the plain language of the underlying statute, which is more
312
forgiving and less likely to preclude meritorious cases.

304. MINN. STAT. § 544.42, subdiv. 6(c) (2016).
305. See Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53 (Lillehaug, J., concurring) (citing Wesely v.
Flor, 806 N.W.2d 36, 41 (Minn. 2011)); see also Brown-Wilbert, Inc. v. Copeland
Buhl & Co., 732 N.W.2d 209, 228 (Minn. 2007) (Anderson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (quoting ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2602, subd. E (1999)).
306. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 48–49.
307. See id. at 51.
308. Id.
309. See Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 228 (Anderson, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
310. Guzick, 869 N.W.2d at 53 (Lillehaug, J., concurring) (citing Wesely, 806
N.W.2d at 41).
311. Id.
312. See id.; see also Brown-Wilbert, 732 N.W.2d at 228 (Anderson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
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